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Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age:
When the Remedy is the Wrong
Ben Depoorter
ABSTRACT
Statutory damage awards are controversial in copyright law. To some, statutory damages are
indispensable to enable the pursuit of meritorious copyright infringement claims that otherwise
are too costly to pursue. Others are convinced that the availability of statutory damages tempts
plaintiffs into asserting dubious infringement claims in order to obtain generous settlement
concessions from risk averse defendants. In light of these contrasting viewpoints, we face the
important policy question whether statutory damages should be redesigned for the digital age or, to
the contrary, be retained in their current form, given the difficulties of enforcing copyrights online.
This Article conducts a comprehensive empirical study of copyright statutory damages. An
extensive examination of docket entries and case law reveals a widespread practice of overclaiming
of remedies in copyright litigation. Although 80 percent of plaintiffs in all disputes claim that
they suffered conduct that constitutes willful infringement, courts find willful infringement in just
2 percent of cases where plaintiffs obtain a favorable verdict.
The findings suggest that remedy overclaiming in copyright serves strategic purposes. For
instance, by highlighting the outer range of enhanced statutory awards in complaints, plaintiffs
leverage the risk aversion of defendants to induce generous settlement concessions. In order to
curb opportunistic uses of the statutory damages, I provide policy suggestions that would make
remedy overclaiming more costly to plaintiffs and less threatening to defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, several major record labels sued a handful of individuals for
distributing music on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. In the ensuing litigation,
one file-sharer was ordered to pay $222,000 in statutory damages for sharing
twenty-four songs online.' In another case, a jury imposed $675,000 in statutory
damages for the sharing of thirty songs.2 A veritable copyright enforcement
industry emerged. Targeting hundreds or even thousands of copyright
defendants,' so-called copyright trolls4 have obtained quick settlements against
users of P2P software.
These lawsuits are enabled by U.S. copyright law's statutory damages
regime.6 The Copyright Act does not require that a copyright holder provide
1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated this amount after a second and third jury
trial had set willful statutory damages at $1.92 million and $1.5 million, respectively. See
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899,901-02 (8th Cir. 2012); see also David
Kravets, Jury in RIAA Trial Slaps $2 Million Fine on Jammie Thomas, WIRED (June 18,2009,
6:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/06/riaa-jury-slaps-2-million-fine-on-jammie-thomas
[http://perma.cc/XE8F-RU4E] (finding liabilty for sharing 24 songs on the Kazaa file-
sharing network).
2. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,490 (1st Cir. 2011); see also Dave
Itzkoff, Student Fined $675,000 in Downloading Case, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (July 31, 2009,
12:34 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/judge-rules-student-is-liable-in-
music-download-case [https://perma.cc/QB8N-2699] (holding Joel Tenenbaum, a Boston
University student, liable for illegally downloading and sharing thirty songs).
3. See, e.g, In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 82
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("These actions are part of a nationwide blizzard of civil actions brought by
purveyors of pornographic films alleging copyright infringement by individuals utilizing a
computer protocol known as BitTorrent."); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical
Study, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1105, 1105 (2015) ("Multi-defendant John Doe lawsuits have
become the most common form of copyright litigation in several U.S. districts, and in
districts such as the Northern District of Illinois, copyright litigation involving pornography
accounts for more than half of new cases.").
4. Targeting large groups of anonymous "Doe defendants," such copyright enforcement
businesses exploit the fear of statutory damages in order to pressure defendants into settling
quickly. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL.
L. REv. 723, 732 (2013) ("A copyright troll refers to an entity whose business revolves around
the systematic legal enforcement of copyrights in which it has acquired a limited ownership
interest.").
5. Sag, supra note 3, at 1111 ("This model generated significant profits from a string of quick
settlements.").
6. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages: A Rarity in
Copyright Laws Internationally, but for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 529, 530-
32 (2013) (contrasting U.S. copyright law remedies to those of other countries and noting
the status of the U.S. as an outlier).
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evidence of harm from infringement in order to recover damages.! Once
infringement has been established, a copyright holder can elect to receive a
statutory damage award.'
Conventional wisdom holds that the system of statutory damages is
indispensable to protect the interests of copyright holders. By eliminating the
burden to prove harm, statutory damages enable the pursuit of meritorious
infringement claims that otherwise would be out of reach for cash-strapped
plaintiffs.9 Independent photographers and designers, for instance, rely on the
litigation-cost-reducing effect of statutory damages in order to obtain recourse
against online infringements of their works by large corporations."
7. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2018) ("[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work,
for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers
are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the
court considers just."). By contrast, in all other areas of intellectual property law, personal
injury lawsuits, and contract law litigation, plaintiff recovery is limited to compensation for
the injury incurred. Even when a jury can impose "punitive damages," such awards are
limited in ways that statutory damages are not. First, constitutional law polices the amount
by which a punitive award can exceed actual damages. See Ben Sheffner, Rebuttal,
Constitutional Limits on Copyright Statutory Damages, in Debate, Unconstitutionally
Excessive Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53,
60-61 (2009). Second, to obtain punitive damages, the plaintiff must provide evidence of
the actual injury.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 14.2, at 14:42 (3d ed.
Supp. 2015) (following the 1976 Copyright Act, statutory damages are an alternative to
damages and profits); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.04[A] (2009 ed.) (A plaintiff may elect statutory damages "regardless of the adequacy
of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the amount of the defendant's profits."
(footnote omitted)).
9. See, e.g., In re Braun, 327 B.R. 447,451-52 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) ("Statutory damages for
copyright infringement are similar to unproven damages for violation of privacy in that
actual damages resulting from such a wrong are difficult to prove, and legislatures have
created a statutory remedy for this reason."); Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory
Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and
Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 265, 273-75 (2009) (asserting
that when U.S. Congress enacted the original Federal Copyright Act in 1790, the purpose of
including statutory damages was to compensate copyright owners for infringements even
when it is difficult to measure actual damages).
10. For an example of a design company pursuing copyright infringements by large apparel
manufacturers and distributors on the basis of statutory damages, see Kali Hays, Appeals
Court to Urban Outfitters: Pay $530,000 After 'Reckless Disregard' of Fabric Copyright, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/fashion/la-ig-wwd-urban-
oufitters-reckless-fabric-copying-20170405-story.html [https://perma.cc/A2DN-CWS4].
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Additionally, by increasing the potential incentives for enforcement of copyright
law, statutory awards help sustain the deterrent effect of copyright law."
In recent years, however, this traditional perspective on statutory damages
has been challenged by a much bleaker outlook.12 There is a growing
understanding that statutory damage awards, as written into the Copyright Act
in 1976, are a poor fit for the digital age." Because a statutory damage award is
set for each individual infringed work, the total damages can add up significantly
for online infringements that involve multiple works.14 For instance, even at the
statutory minimum of $750 for each file, a user of a file-sharing network faces
potential statutory damages of $360,000 when sharing forty songs. At the other
end of the statutorily provided range, a plaintiff can claim enhanced damages of
up to $150,000 against someone who, for example, watched an illegal live
stream.15  Finally, due to the sheer amount of infringed works, digital
intermediaries and online platforms face claims for astronomically high
statutory damage awards. In one case involving secondary liability for operating
a file-sharing network, the plaintiff demanded a statutory damages award of $75
trillion. 16 Similarly, Google's Book Search project exposed Google to potential
11. See, e.g, Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that one potential purpose of statutory damages under the Copyright Act is "to
penalize the infringer and to deter future violations" (quoting Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie
Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1991))); Sheffner, supra note 7, at 60 (emphasizing
the role of statutory damages in effective deterrence in the face of massive online copyright
infringements).
12. See infra Subpart II.B.
13. Id.
14. This danger has also been recognized outside of the online context. See, e.g, Broad. Music,
Inc. v. H.S.I., Inc., No. C2-06-482, 2007 WL 4207901, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (public
performance at a bar) ("The practice of awarding damages according to the number of
technical infringements is troubling precisely because it places damages at the mercy of
Plaintiffs. Measuring damages by the number of infringements permits Plaintiffs to ramp-
up the punishment arbitrarily, independent of the underlying harm.").
15. Streaming video content and live streaming of sports events are a major area of copyright
infringement in the digital era. See, e.g, Todd Spangler, Global Piracy in 2017: TV and Music
Illegal Activity Rose, While Film Declined, VARIETY (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:00 AM),
https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/piracy-global-2017-tv-music-film-illegal-
streaming-1202731243 [https://perma.cc/25CN-WQZ6] ("Around 53% of total piracy
occurred on unlicensed streaming platforms...."); Ernesto Van der Sar, Tickbox Must
Remove Pirate Streaming Addons From Sold Devices, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 14, 2018),
http://torrentfreak.com/tickbox-remove-pirate-streaming-addons- 180214
[https://perma.cc/673H-MFGC] ("Online streaming piracy is on the rise and many people
now use dedicated media players to watch content through their regular TVs.").
16. Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, RIAA Thinks LimeWire Owes $75 Trillion in Damages, PCWORLD
(Mar. 26, 2011, 5:44 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/223431/riaa-thinks
limewire owes 75 trillionin-damages.html [https://perma.cc/972S-TNCW]; see also
Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 6, at 563 ("In the LimeWire case, the plaintiffs
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liability of at least $4.5 billion." Critics observe that the availability of statutory
damages tempts plaintiffs into asserting dubious infringement claims."
These two contrasting viewpoints raise an important question: To what
extent are statutory damages applied opportunistically by rent-seeking plaintiffs
as opposed to providing cash-strapped copyright holders an avenue to
pursue meritorious infringement claims? This controversy goes to the core of
copyright enforcement in the digital age: Since 2008, copyright holders face
massive amounts of copyright infringements online and have reacted by
aggressively enforcing their rights.19 In response, copyright holders turned to
automated enforcement tactics 20 that spit out takedown notices on a massive
scale.21 Statutory damages play a crucial role in this issue. In copyright law,
remedies dictate what claims actually get filed and litigated, and how those
claims are evaluated by defendants. The familiar ideal is that the remedy should
reportedly requested an amount of statutory damages that was more than the combined
GDP of the entire world." (footnote omitted)).
17. Between 2002 and 2015, Google scanned millions of books for its universal library project
without permission. See Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Author's Guild v.
Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136), 2011 WL 5905500.
Four-and-a-half billion dollars is a conservative estimate of damages based on the statutory
minimum of $750 per book that Google scanned without permission from the copyright
holder. See Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 6, at 563 n.148. On the Google Books
project generally, see Stephen Heyman, Google Books: A Complex and Controversial
Experiment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/arts/
international/google-books-a-complex-and-controversial-experiment.html.
18. Sag, supra note 5, at 1114; see also Matthew Sag & Jake Haskell, Defense Against the Dark
Arts of Copyright Trolling, 103 IOWA L. REv. 571, 573 (2018). Although dubious
infringement claims are likely to be negated in litigation, the average defendant may prefer
to settle the dispute and avoid incurring the costs of defending the claim in court. See, e.g.,
James DeBriyn, SheddingLight on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis ofMass CopyrightLitigation
in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 79, 110 (2012) (positing that the
threat of "outlandish" statutory damage awards are used to force settlements).
19. For an overview, see REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION
29-33 (2011) (describing P2P related litigation); Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel & Sven
Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1258-63 (2011) (describing scaled
litigation campaign by the recording industry). See also Kristina Groennings, Costs and
Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
571, 590 (2005) (describing lawsuits that involved the misidentification of file-sharers).
20. See Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
319, 326 (2013) (describing the use of bots in order to automate and scale online copyright
enforcement).
21. See, e.g, Chris Welch, Google Received Over 75 Million Copyright Takedown Requests in
February, VERGE (Mar. 7,2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/7/11172516/
google-takedown-requests-75-million [https://perma.cc/C5X9-ZSAP]. For a critical
analysis of ongoing practices and the lack of transparency in this field, see Maayan Perel &
Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REv. 473 (2016).
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"fit the wrong,"22 but if the opportunistic narrative on statutory damages is
correct, in copyright law the remedies actually create the wrong. As a matter of
public policy, we face the important question of whether statutory damages
should be redesigned for the digital age or, to the contrary, be retained in their
current form, given the difficulties of enforcing copyrights online.23
Despite the controversy, systematic and comprehensive information on
the use of statutory damage awards by litigants is absent, leaving us with many
unanswered questions. We have little to no information on when and how
copyright holders turn to statutory damages when challenging copyright
infringers. To what extent do plaintiffs use statutory damages in an
opportunistic manner? Or do statutory damages mostly serve the beneficial
function of increasing access to justice for cash-strapped copyright holders? We
also lack comprehensive information on the role of courts in mediating statutory
damage claims by plaintiffs.24 Courts may enhance statutory awards when they
deem the defendant's infringement willful, but what definition or definitions of
"willfulness" do courts employ when assigning enhanced statutory awards? Is it
possible to distill a reliable set of factors from the pertinent case law? Answers to
these questions are essential if the U.S. Congress is to effectively reform and
adapt the Copyright Act to the digital age.25
22. E.g., David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REv.665,668-
69 (1985) ("The penalty, in common penal parlance, should fit the wrong....").
23. Congress seemed poised to address this question, as it was preparing to revise the 1976
Copyright Act in 2013, including the statutory damage provisions. The Register's Callfor
Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. &
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 44 (2013) (statement of Hon. Bob
Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), http://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/113-20_80067.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EUK-X8SB] (referencing
"the Register's call to revise, rather than update, the Copyright Act"). The House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet conducted a
series of copyright review hearings. See, e.g., A Case Study for Consensus Building: The
Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. &
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 37 (2013) (testimony of Pamela
Samuelson, Faculty Dir., Berkeley Ctr. for Law & Tech.), http://judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/113-31-80976.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK6P-N2L6].
24. While the leading treatises describe common patterns in the case law, to date no statistical
analysis has been conducted on the application of statutory damages in dockets or legal
opinions. The most comprehensive extant study is the review of opinions undertaken by
Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, which highlights the inconsistent nature of the
case law. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:
A Remedy in Need ofReform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439 (2009).
25. Calls for the reform of statutory damages have been made by various interested actors,
including judges, academics, public interest organizations, and the Copyright Office itself
See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,490 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting
that Congress might wish to examine the application of the Copyright Act regarding
statutory damages); Pamela Samuelsonet al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for
406
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This Article examines the role of statutory damages in the copyright arena
on the basis of an in-depth empirical analysis of docket records and case law. I
conduct a docket study using a publicly available database containing docket
entries, complaints, and pertinent documents from approximately one
thousand copyright disputes,26 providing valuable new insights on the types of
claims, plaintiffs, and defendants involved in statutory damage litigation. Also,
I systematically analyze all 102 judicial decisions on copyright statutory damages
by courts over a three-year period.27
The findings reveal that statutory damages claims are commonplace in
virtually all areas of copyright law.28 Plaintiffs in copyright litigation request
statutory damages in 90 percent of pleadings.29 Instead of seeking compensation
for the actual harm suffered from infringement, a large majority of plaintiffs turn
to juries to set a statutory award. Not only that, copyright holders, even in
industries that enjoy only weak copyright protection, almost universally claim
that they are entitled to enhanced statutory damages due to willful infringement.
However, courts rarely grant enhanced damages. Plaintiffs sought enhanced
damages for willful infringement in 81 percent of all copyright disputes in the
examined period, yet courts awarded enhanced damages in less than 2 percent
of all cases that moved to verdict. The striking gap between the demand and
supply of statutory damages, as well as several additional factors relating to
nature of claims and subject-matter areas, undermine the credibility of the
nearly ubiquitous claims of willful infringement by plaintiffs.
These findings suggest that remedy overclaiming in copyright serves
strategic purposes. For instance, by highlighting the outer range of enhanced
Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010) ("[A]lthough copyright law today works
reasonably well in some domains, it can be improved and should be refined in light of
dramatic technological advances."); David Sohn, Copyright Office Calls for Major Reforms
to Copyright Law, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://cdt.org/blog/copyright-office-calls-for-major-reforms-to-copyright-law [https://perma.cc/
HC56-3L3N].
26. The Copyright Data Project consists of a random sample of 957 out of the 17,119 federal
copyright disputes filed from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008. Of those 957 cases, 294
were filed in 2005,267 in 2006,206 in 2007, and 190 in 2008. The database contains 46 coded
fields for those disputes, alongwith 125 variables. Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson,
Copyright's Topography: An Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1981,
1984-86 (2014) [hereinafter Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright's Topography]; Christopher A.
Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright Data Project, COPYRIGHT L. DATA,
http://www.copyrightlawdata.com [https://perma.cc/QJ7T-U9AL] [hereinafter Cotropia &
Gibson, Copyright Data Project]. A separate, additional coding of several remedial aspects
of the disputes in the database was conducted for this study, and it is reported in Part III.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part III.
29. Infra Part III.
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statutory awards in complaints, plaintiffs leverage the risk aversion of
defendants to induce generous settlement concessions. First, claims of willful
infringement might be deployed by plaintiffs as a "bait-and-switch" tactic: By
accusing the defendant of willful infringement, a plaintiff may appear more
reasonable to the court and jury when subsequently requesting the application
of damage awards in the regular statutory range and may hope to obtain a higher
award overall. Second, by highlighting the potential application of enhanced
damages for willful infringement, plaintiffs are able to intimidate risk-averse
defendants into generous settlements. In doing so, plaintiffs are able to leverage
the risk aversion of many defendants, especially individual defendants and small
businesses. Plaintiffs might anticipate that accused infringers will prefer to avoid
the uncertain outcome in the relief stage and thus settle the dispute out of court.
The alternative for these defendants-incurring steep litigation costs to bring a
successful defense-is dire."
Infringement claims that are strong on the merits but include doubtful
damage claims are especially vexing to accused infringers. Although the risk of
a steep damage award might be minimal, the plaintiff is likely to win the case on
the substantive merits. Because the Copyright Act enables a winning party to
recoup his or her litigation costs by way of fee-shifting," the defendant also faces
the unpleasant prospect of incurring considerable legal expenses. The anxiety of
risk-averse defendants is further amplified by various features of copyright law,
including the considerable discretion of juries in setting awards along the
statutory range and the uncertainty about litigation outcomes.
I provide several recommendations that would curtail opportunistic
applications of enhanced statutory damages. First, Section 505 of the Copyright
Act couldbe revised so that courts are able to take away from prevailing plaintiffs
the benefit of fee-shifting if they overstated the damage claim. Second, courts
should be enabled to award attorney fees against a prevailing plaintiff who
30. See, e.g., Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/05music.html [https://perma.cc/L84B-
934J] (describing imposition of $222,000 statutory damage award against file-sharer). When,
for instance, the recording industry offered individual offenders the opportunity to settle
their cases for amounts ranging between $3000 and $11,000, most of the reportedly 30,000
defendants did so without hesitation. See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later
[https://perma.cc/AUC4-PMXA]. On the use of threats to obtain settlements in copyright
litigation, see William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow
oflP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &HIGH TECH. L.J. 453,463-66 (2012) (documenting
the strategic use of "cease and desist" letters and threats of IP litigation on the basis of
original empirical data derived from 58 in-person interviews with experienced lawyers).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018). For an in-depth discussion, see infra Subpart I.A.
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engaged in egregious overclaiming of the damage entitlement. Both approaches
would make the abuse of the statutory damage framework costlier and induce
more realistic claims for relief by copyright plaintiffs. Third, an alternative tactic
could reduce the overall risk of abusive damage claims to defendants. This could
be accomplished through various measures, including the formulation of
judicial guidelines, reducing the scope of enhanced damages, and making
statutory damages unavailable when evidence of the inflicted harm is readily
available. By reducing uncertainty about the actual application of statutory
awards in courts, these measures, or a combination thereof, would curb the more
opportunistic and abusive practices, while retaining statutory damages as a
crutch for cash-strapped plaintiffs with meritorious claims.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the statutory damages
framework under federal copyright law. Part II describes the background,
motivation, and unintended consequences of statutory damages in copyright
law. Parts III and IV describe the empirical studies and present their main
findings. More specifically, Part III explores docket and court records, while
Part IV looks behind the docket entries to examine the precedents set out in the
case law. Together, both studies help to evaluate the credibility of damage claims
by plaintiff against the considerations and practices adopted by courts. Part V
provides policy recommendations.
I. DAMAGES AWARDS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law has a peculiar remedial framework. Once infringement has
been established, a plaintiff may elect a statutory damage award. In doing so,
Section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act relieves the copyright holder from the
burden of providing any evidence whatsoever of actual harm.32 Among
developed Western democracies, the U.S. copyright statutory framework is
exceptional."
The Copyright Act provides the courts wide discretion to determine
awards within the statutory parameters as it "considers just."34 The framework
of statutory damages incorporates a threefold structure that consists of regular,
reduced, and enhanced damages.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018); see also supra note 6.
33. See Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 6, at 534-35 ("[O]nly five [World Intellectual
Property Organization] member states including the United States have both an 'advanced
economy' and statutory damages for copyright infringement.. .. " (footnotes omitted)).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
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First, Section 504 enables a successful copyright plaintiff 5 to recover
regular statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits. Section
504(c)(1) provides that a copyright owner may elect the following:
[T]o recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable
jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than
$30,000 as the court considers just.3 6
This process may occur at any time before a final judgment is reached.
The statutory range provides courts with substantial discretion in setting
awards between the minimum and maximum threshold. Although the
Copyright Act does not set out any further specifications or guidelines, courts
have been observed to focus on several goals when setting awards. In
determining what amount of statutory damages to impose, courts may consider
factors such as "the expenses saved and profits reaped by the defendants in
connection with the infringements, [and] the revenues lost by the plaintiffs as a
result of the defendant's conduct." 7 Additionally, courts are at liberty to set a
number within the statutory range without inquiring into evidence. Finally, in
setting an award within the statutorily provided range, courts can adjust an
award in order to deter future infringements by the defendant and other
potential infringers." This deterrent purpose significantly increases the
discretion of courts and the unpredictability of statutory awards.3 9
35. The Copyright Act does require the registration of a copyright claim on the work in question
prior to litigation. Id. § 411(a).
36. Id. § 504(c)(1).
37. N.A.S. Import, Corp. v. Chenson Enters., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Boz
Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D. Conn. 1980)). This compensatory
approach to statutory damages adds another layer of relief for copyright litigation plaintiffs.
Defendants already carry most of the evidentiary burden when a plaintiff elects to recover
actual damages, due to the statutory presumption that an infringer's profits are entirely
attributable to the copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). However, if it is clear that
the plaintiff suffered no actual damages, courts tend to limit recovery to the statutory
minimum. For a concise but useful overview of statutory damage determinations in federal
courts, see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 14.2.1, at 14:48 & n.21(3d ed.
Supp. 2012).
38. See Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 6, at 547 (discussing general deterrence
rationale of statutory damages).
39. It has been argued that courts should apply due process jurisprudence more strictly to
copyright statutory damage outcomes, see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 491-
97; Samuelson, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright
Cases, supra note 7, 56-57 (2009) (arguing that punitive applications of the statutory
damage framework against strangers to the litigation runs afoul of constitutional due
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Second, Section 504(c)(2) provides lowered statutory damage awards for
"good faith" infringers. These defendants must sustain the burden that they
were either unaware or without reason to believe that they were committing
copyright infringement. In such cases, Section 504(c)(2) provides the court with
the discretion to reduce the award of statutory damages "to a sum of not less than
$200" per infringement.4 0 The burden of proving good faith rests firmly on the
shoulders of the defendant.4 1 The defendant must not only prove that he or she
made a good faith estimation that his or her behavior was noninfringing but
must also be reasonable in sustaining that belief.4 2 The best available evidence to
date indicates, however, that courts rarely apply the reduced statutory award
provision.4 3
Third, whenever a copyright owner finds that infringement was committed
"willfully," a court may enhance the award of statutory damages. Section
504(c)(2) provides courts with the discretion to increase the award of statutory
damages for willful infringements to a sum of "not more than $150,000."44
While willfulness in this instance has not been defined by Congress, the
leading treatise understand "willfulness" to refer to the state of mind of the
process principles). But see, e.g., Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d
574, 586-88 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that statutory damage awards are judged under a
more deferential standard than punitive damages).
40. 17 U.S.C § 504(c)(2). Additionally, the Copyright Act includes a teacher-librarian-
broadcaster exception. Section 504(c)(2) provides that "[t]he court shall remit statutory
damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing
that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107." This provision
applies if the infringer was:
(i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or
archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such
institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work
in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person
who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity
(as defined in section 118(f)) infringed by performing a published nondramatic
literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a
performance of such a work.
Id.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 162-63 (1976).
42. E.g., Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172,1176 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
43. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 453-54, 454 n.57 (citing R. Anthony Reese,
Innocent Infringement in U.S. CopyrightLaw:A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 133 (2007)).
Reese provides a comprehensive treatment of innocent infringers in copyright law and
shows the increasing risks of committing copyright infringement over time.
44. 17 U.S.C § 504(c)(2). Although Congress intended this designation to only apply to
"exceptional cases," courts have generally interpreted "willfulness" broadly. See Samuelson
& Wheatland, supra note 24, at 441 & n.4 (citing "S. REP. No. 94-473, at 144-45 (1975)
(stating that enhanced damages should be available in'exceptional cases'); H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 162 (1975) (same)").
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infringer.45 A finding of willfulness may also include situations where an
infringer exhibited reckless disregard of a copyright holder's rights, even when
lacking actual knowledge of infringement.46 Factors that have been held to
constitute reckless disregard include a defendant's prior history of
infringements, willful blindness, and legal mistakes made by the infringer in the
absence of legal counsel.47 By contrast, a defendant is not "willful" when she has
been notified that her conduct infringes copyrights but reasonably and in good
faith believes the contrary.48 For instance, willfulness may be negated4 9 when a
fair use decision is a close call."
Despite these valuable insights on judicial practices involving statutory
awards, it remains open to question whether statutory awards can be predicted
adequately ex ante. Several commentators criticize the lack of overall
45. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37, § 14.2.1.2, at 14:50 (3d ed. Supp. 2012); see also Lydia Pallas
Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal
Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 835,874 (1999) (stating that " [t]he exact nature ofthe defendant's mental state required
for enhanced statutory damages is less than clear").
46. See Island Software & Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 413 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2005)
("To prove 'willfulness' under the Copyright Act, the plaintiff must show (1) that the
defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or (2) that the defendant's actions
were the result of 'reckless disregard' for, or 'willful blindness' to, the copyright holder's
rights." (citing Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003); Lipton v. Nature
Co., 71 F.3d 464,472 (2d Cir. 1995); N.A.S. Import Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d
250,252 (2d Cir. 1992); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001)).
47. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 14.04, 11-12.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (court
remanded on the issue of willfulness, stating that the defendants' belief that their
unauthorized copying of coursepacks constituted fair use was not "so unreasonable as to
bespeak willfulness") (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 14.04[B] [3] (1996) (" [O]ne who has been notified that his conduct constitutes
copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith believes the contrary, is not
'willful' for these purposes.")).
50. There is a widely shared belief in the academic literature that fair use decisions are very
difficult to predict. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.1, at 12:3
(3d ed. Supp. 2017) ("No copyright doctrine is less determinate than fair use."); Michael W.
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV 1087, 1106 (2007) ("[L]eading courts and
commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor test as interpreted provides very
little guidance for predicting whether a particular use will be deemed fair." (citation
omitted)); Pierre N. Leval, Commentaries, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1106 (1990) ("Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use."). But see
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2008) (" [M]uch of our conventional wisdom about [U.S.] fair use case
law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong."); Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537,2541 (2009) (" [F]air use law is both more
coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one
recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns.
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consistency of the case law. Based on an extensive reading of case law on
statutory awards, Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland have concluded that
the statutory damages regime "has been applied in a manner that often results in
arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and grossly excessive awards and that
reform is needed to address these problems."5
II. STATUTORY DAMAGES AWARDS: CONTROVERSY
A. The Optimistic Viewpoint
Congress adopted statutory damages in the Copyright Act of 1909 as a
baseline level of compensation for circumstances in which the cost of
quantifying harm rivaled or exceeded the actual harm. The 1909 Act expressly
stated that such recovery "shall not be regarded as a penalty."52 As the threat of
digital piracy emerged in the mid-1990s, copyright industries persuaded
Congress to ramp up the upper bound for statutory damages levels to $150,000
per work for willful infringement. To this date, Section 504 of the Copyright Act
exists as an important instrument to alleviate the evidentiary burdens of plaintiff
copyright-holders.
The premise is that copyright plaintiffs often face grave difficulty in
providing evidence of injury for many copyright infringements.5 ' The litigation
involving file sharing highlights this issue. When an infringer makes a music file
available for downloading on a P2P network, it is hard for a copyright holder to
prove how many times the file has actually been downloaded from the defendant
51. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 497; see also id. at 485 ("Inconsistent statutory
damage rulings in factually similar cases are, moreover, easy to find." (footnote omitted)).
52. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081.
53. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, § 14.2, at 14:42 (3d ed. Supp. 2015) ("The rationale commonly
given for statutory damages is that, because actual damages are so often difficult to prove,
only the promise of a statutory award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce
their copyrights. . . ." (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228,
232 (1952) ("Few bodies of law would be more difficult to reduce to a short and simple
formula than that which determines the measure of damage recoverable for actionable
wrongs. The necessary flexibility to do justice in the variety of situations which copyright
cases present can be achieved only by exercise of the wide judicial discretion within limited
amounts conferred by this statute."); Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207,209 (1935) ("In
many cases plaintiffs, though proving infringement, were able to recover only nominal
damages, in spite of the fact that preparation and trial of the case imposed substantial
expense and inconvenience. The ineffectiveness of the remedy encouraged willful and
deliberate infringement.")). But see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 501-02
(questioning this default assumption and recommending that parties "offer proof of
damages and profits, or, in the alternative, to demonstrate why damages or profits are
sufficiently difficult to prove that it is justifiable to offer no such proof').
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by other online users.54 Even if it would be possible to demonstrate how many
times a file had been downloaded from an individual defendant, the intractable
question of the precise injury arises: How many of those downloads displaced
actual sales that would have taken place if the file had not been made available by
the infringer?ss Such difficult questions of attribution also arise outside the
context of digital technologies. For instance, when the band Green Day plays a
video that includes a copyrighted image in the background of its stage
performance during a live tour without permission of the image's author, how
much of its concert revenue is attributable to the infringement?5 6
This difficulty of proving actual damages convinced Congress that the
promise of a statutory award is necessary to enable copyright holders to enforce
their rights in ways that will provide a deterrent to potential infringers. Even
after successfully demonstrating infringement, plaintiffs often faced significant
expense in proving harm." Thus, the costs of proving injury might outweigh the
actual harm of infringement for many smaller claim copyright disputes. As a
result, copyright holders in small claim disputes do not have a financial incentive
to bring suit." The accepted wisdom is that without statutory damages, too
54. Sheffner, supra note 7, at 71 (noting that P2P network configuration "prevents third-party
knowledge of transfers between peers").
55. Although causal evidence of individual damage is difficult to obtain, several studies seek to
obtain empirical evidence on the general impact of file-sharing on traditional music sales.
For an overview, see Stan J. Liebowitz, Economists Examine File Sharing and Music Sales, in
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin Peitz
eds., 2006). Most studies establish a negative impact of P2P activities on music sales. See,
e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (2006) (presenting evidence that file-sharing adversely impacts record industry
revenues). A few studies find, however, that file sharing has no statistically significant effect
on music industry sales. See, e.g, Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of
File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. EcON. 1 (2007).
56. The court ultimately found fair use, primarily because the video had transformed the
originalphoto. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170,1179 (9th Cir. 2013).
57. Cunningham, 294 U.S. at 209 (1935) ("[T]he old law was unsatisfactory. In many cases
plaintiffs, though proving infringement, were able to recover only nominal damages, in spite
of the fact that preparation and trial of the case imposed substantial expense and
inconvenience. The ineffectiveness of the remedy encouraged willful and deliberate
infringement.").
58. In many small claim disputes, the evidentiary burden turns copyright infringement claims
into suits with negative expected value. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (providing an economic
model of the behavior of rational litigants). On the economics of small claims in copyright
law, see Ben Depoorter, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Promise and Pitfalls of a
Copyright Small Claims Process, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
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many infringements might go unenforced, which would threaten to erode the
creative incentives that the Copyright Act seeks to protect.5 9
B. The Pessimistic Viewpoint
Over the past decade or so, the conventional outlook on statutory damages
has been challenged. The perception among commentators is that statutory
damages have set the path for excessive court awards in copyright law,60 as
highlighted by the spectacular awards in file-sharing litigation.61 Whereas
traditional piracy involved making multiple unauthorized copies of a
copyrighted work, in the digital age, infringers commonly make one copy of
multiple works. Because statutory damage awards, as set forth in the Copyright
Act of 1976, are applied for each infringed work, the total amount can add up
significantly for online infringements. Even at the statutory minimum of $750
for each infringed work, the typical infringer on a file-sharing network may face
an award of statutory damages in the several hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Additionally, if a plaintiff claims enhanced damages for willful infringement, a
defendant faces potential liability of up to $150,000 for each infringed work. The
shadow of these numbers may loom large over disputes62 and prompt settlement
59. See generally 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.2, at 12:34 (2d ed. 1996)
("because actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a statutory
award will induce copyright owners to invest in and enforce their copyrights").
60. See, e.g., Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 6, at 530 ("Virtually all of the law review
literature in the United States has criticized the U.S. statutory damage regime." (footnote
omitted)).
61. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012) (reinstating
award of $222,000 in statutory damages for sharing twenty-four songs online); Sony BMG
Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011) (reinstating award of
$675,000 in statutory damages for sharing thirty songs); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra
note 24, at 480 ("The Thomas, MP3.com, and Free Republic cases ... are examples of cases in
which copyright statutory damage awards have been grossly excessive...." (footnotes
omitted)). For other examples of allegedly disproportionate statutory damage awards, see
id. at 481-91.
62. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (classic treatment of the impact of the legal system on
settlement negotiations in the divorce context).
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concessions by risk-averse defendants, 63 capitalized upon by copyright trolls and
other new enforcement business models in recent years.64
To date, comprehensive information on the use of statutory damage
awards by litigants is lacking. We have no information on how copyright holders
systematically employ statutory damages to address copyright infringements.
Do most plaintiffs employ statutory damages in an opportunistic manner, or do
statutory damages mostly serve the benevolent role of relieving copyright
holders from the burden of proving damages? Second, there is little-to-no
comprehensive information available on how courts treat statutory damage
claims.65 Where and on what basis do courts set the statutory damage award
within the statutory range? When and how do courts mediate the compensatory
and deterrent purposes of statutory damages? What definition or definitions of
"willfulness" do courts employ when assigning enhanced statutory awards? Is it
possible to distill a reliable set of factors from the pertinent case law?
Fortunately, empirical analysis can help answer these questions. A careful
examination of docket records can reveal to what extent statutory damages are
employed opportunistically in situations where injuries are likely to be
63. See Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2006)
(describing settlement incentives in the context of infringement actions for peer-to-peer
file-sharing). In light of the potential costs imposed by the statutory damages regime of the
Copyright Act, many persons accused of infringement choose to settle rather than litigate,
even if they believe a plaintiff s claim to be without merit. This can set in motion a one-way
ratchet effect towards more generous settlements. Cf James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (describing how risk
aversion and user caution create licensing customs that reduce the perceived scope of
permissible uses); see also Ben Depoorter, Essay, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The
Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 957 (2010) (showing evidence of the
feedback effect of settlement information in the context of tort litigation). Overall, copyright
liability can have a chilling effect on investments in innovative technologies that provide
products and services incorporating copyrighted content. Michael A. Carrier, Copyright
and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 891, 895 (reporting on the basis of
qualitiative empirical evidence of an industry belief "that the Napster decision reduced
innovation and that it led to a venture capital 'wasteland."').
64. For an excellent analysis of the problems associated with copyright trolling, see Balganesh,
supra note 3, at 728-29 (describing how trolling disrupts copyright's "enforcement
equilibrium"). On the challenges as well as opportunities of a more regulated market of
third-party copyright enforcement, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Essay, Copyright
Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 2277 (2013).
65. While the leading treatises seek to describe common patterns in the case law, to date no
statistical analysis has been conducted on the application of statutory damages in dockets or
legal opinions. The most comprehensive extant study is Samuelson & Wheatland's review
of opinions, highlighting the inconsistent nature of the case law. See Samuelson &
Wheatland, supra note 24.
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minimal.66 For instance, opportunistic litigation is more likely to involve
disputes where there is minimal harm to the plaintiff, defendants are small and
risk averse, and multiple works are infringed. Additionally, systematic
examination of judicial opinions may reveal the most pertinent patterns with
regard to the range, frequency, and the determination of statutory awards by
courts.
This Article provides the first in-depth empirical analysis that engages the
aforementioned issues. In what follows, I examine both the demand for and
supply of statutory damage awards on the basis of an analysis of a random
selection of almost one thousand copyright disputes over a four-year period.
III. DOCKET STUDY
A. Dataset
The docket study presented in this Part is based on the Copyright Data
Project, a publicly available database that contains docket entries, complaints,
and other documents of almost one thousand copyright disputes from the
period between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008.67 The list of cases was
populated by a search on Bloomberg Law of all cases filed in federal courts from
January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008 for which the "Nature of Suit" is
Copyright.6 8 This four-year period provides an ideal window to study statutory
damages since it allows us to compare the role of statutory damages in the
context of P2P file sharing on the one hand, with more commonplace copyright
disputes on the other. The final list of cases in the database contains a random
selection of 957 out of 17,119 cases. By randomizing the cases for analysis, the
analysis is based on a representative set of cases.6 9 The docket database contains
66. On the valuable insights to be obtained from docket studies, see generally David A. Hoffman
et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 685 (2007) ("By
looking at each individual order in the cases' e-dockets, we can illuminate what the law's
rights and duties actually mean in practice. A legal right, after all, is given meaning by how
the litigation to enforce it unfolds.").
67. Of those 957 cases, 294 were filed in 2005, 267 in 2006, 206 in 2007, and 190 in 2008.
Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright Data Project, supra note 26. The 2005-2008 period provides
a unique vantage point since it enables comparison between regular copyright disputes and
file-sharing litigation. These observations likely remain valid today since the copyright
landscape has not been impacted by any major structural or legislative changes since then.
68. Additionally, a separate, additional coding of verdicts was conducted for this Article and is
reported in Part IV.
69. Randomization is the proven method of statistical analysis to obtain a statistically
representative sample from a larger data set. See generally DAVID M DIEZ, CHRISTOPHER D
BARR, MINE CETINKAYA-RUNDEL, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS WITH RANDOMIZATION AND
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46 coded fields and 125 different variables on each of the copyright disputes
randomly selected from that period.
It is helpful to summarize a few general observations about copyright
litigation. In their topography of the field, Christopher Cotropia and James
Gibson observe that (1) "the Central District of California and Southern District
of New York are 'hot districts' for copyright cases,""o (2) copyright cases are "no
more likely to get contentious than other civil litigation, [but] when they do get
contentious, they get very contentious-resulting in significantly more docket
entries, substantive rulings, and trials,"" and (3) copyright dockets contain a
remarkable number of (successful) small firms and "low IP" industries.7 2 Where
pertinent, the analysis below will take into account these particularities of
copyright disputes. Additionally, the results will distinguish between "regular"
and "peer-to-peer" (P2P) or file-sharing cases. Separating both types of cases is
important given the flood of P2P litigation in the 2005-2008 period.
B. Pleadings
The table below contains the remedy sought by plaintiffs in copyright
disputes. As expected, injunctions are commonplace in copyright disputes.
Copyright holders seek to enjoin copyright infringements in all but a few cases
(96.34 percent). Additionally, copyright plaintiffs plead enhanced statutory
damages in almost 70 percent of all disputes. By contrast, plaintiffs elect recovery
of actual damages in less than 19 percent of disputes.
Table 1: Remedy Pleadings (n=383)
Statutory IDamages-Willful 69.71%
Actual Damauges 18.54%
llma~s StatutoryN Damages-Regular 5.48%
None 6.27%
Injunction Pleaded 96.34%
SIMULATION 10-11 (2014), https://www.openintro.org/download.php?file=isrsltablet
[https://perma.cc/62C6-UK7N].
70. Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright's Topography, supra note 26, at 1984. However, "the data
indicate that cases in those districts are less likely to result in a plaintiff win." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The term "Low-IP industries" is used to describe works for which the scope of
intellectual property protection is minimal. See id. at 1985-86 & 1985 n.10.
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The next few tables further parse out the data. The findings are
distinguished across different types of copyright plaintiffs. I first turn to the size
of the parties in the dispute: Fortune 1000 companies (and subsidiaries),
individuals (including Does), and small firms (any party that did not fall into one
of the two previous categories).
With regard to types of plaintiffs and remedy pursued, the results reveal a
clear distinction between regular and P2P litigation. Overall, in the 2005-2008
period, Fortune 1000 (F1000) companies elected willful statutory damages in 89
percent of all claims (563 out of 627 cases). When removing P2P litigation from
the sample (Table 3 below), F1000 companies are found to elect willful statutory
damages in only 44 percent of cases (51 out of 115). Additionally, the results
confirm the conventional understanding that smaller plaintiffs are more likely
to be drawn to willful statutory damages-especially in cases of minor
infringement-to avoid the evidentiary burden of proving actual damages.
Looking at non-P2P litigation exclusively, small firms plead willful statutory
damages in 70 percent of the sampled cases (175 out of 248 cases).74 Overall,
willful statutory damages are elected in a majority of all copyright cases. Even
when excluding P2P cases,75 60 percent of all claimants in copyright disputes
plead willful statutory damages.
73. Id. at 1992. As a general observation, in the Cotropia & Gibson sample, the ranks ofplaintiffs
in copyright litigation involving non-P2P cases are dominated by small firms (64.23
percent). Individuals (21.41 percent) and Fortune 1000 companies (14.36 percent) were less
often plaintiffs in these cases. Id. Note also that authors of the copyrighted work were
plaintiffs in the vast majority of non-P2P cases (81.72 percent). Id. This suggests that if
"copyright trolls" are active during this period, their activities do not show up on docket
entries. "On the defendant side of the caption, smaller firms dominated even more than
they did as plaintiffs; they constituted the largest defendant 72.06% of the time. Fortune
1000 companies were a distant second, at 14.62% (which means they tend to be sued as often
as they sue). Individuals placed third, at 13.32%, even though Doe defendants were coded
as individuals." Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. By comparison, F1000 plaintiffs in non-P2P cases elect willful statutory damages in 44% of
cases.
75. When including P2P cases, 81 percent of cases involve willful infringement claims. In every
P2P case on the dockets in this four-year period, the music plaintiffs claimed statutory
damages for willful infringement (513 disputes).
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Table 2: Plaintiff Claims-All Cases
Plead F1000 Individual Small Firm Total
Statutory-Willful 563 41 175 779(89%) (50%) (70%) (81%)
Statutory- 61 9 13 83
Regular (9.7%) (10.9%) (5.2%) (8.6%)
2 22 47 71
(0.3%) (26.9%) (18.9%) (7.4%)
1 10 13 24
None (0.15%) (12%) (5.2%) (2.5%)
627 82 248 957Total (65.5%) (8.6%) (25.9%)
Table 3: Plaintiff Claims-non-P2P Cases
Plead 1:1000 Inividual Small Iirm Total
Statutory- 51 41 175 267
Willful (44.3%) (50%) (70.6%) (60%)
Statutory- 61 9 13 83
Regular (53%) (11%) (5.2%) (18.7%)
Actual 2 22 47 71
Damages (1.7%) (26.8%) (19%) (16%)
1 10 13 24
None (0.9%) (12.2%) (5.2%) (5.4%)
115 82 248 445
Total (25.8%) (18.4%) (55.7%)
On the other side of the coin, small firm defendants disproportionally face
claims for statutory willful damages (72.6 percent). Individual defendants and
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F1000 companies evenly split the remaining cases (12.7 percent and 14.6
percent, respectively). 7 6
Table 4: Type of Defendants-Commonplace Cases
Statutory-
Willful
39
(14.6%)
34
(12.7%)
194
(72.6%)
267
Statutory- 4 12 67 83
Regular (4.8%) (14.4%) (80.7%)
13 5 50 71
Actual Damages (18.3%) (7%) (70.4%)
9 15 24
None (37.5%) (62.5%)
56 60 329 445
Total (12.5%) (13.4%) (73.9%)
76. See infra Table 4.
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Table 5 below illustrates differences across copyright industries." Plaintiffs
in the fashion industry disproportionately elected willful statutory damages as
their preferred remedy. Interestingly, claims of willfulness regularly surfaced in
low IP industries (apparel/fashion textile, architecture, and industrial designs)
despite the fact that copyright protection is rather limited in those industries.
77. Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright's Topography, supra note 26, at 1992 (Although some
industry associated with low IP protection (including fashion) show up strongly on the
dockets, "[N]o one industry dominated; the most litigious industry was
Apparel/Fashion/Textiles, clocking in at 13.58%.").
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Table 5: Remedy Pursued-Per Industry
Advertising and Marketing 6 2
Apparel/Fashion/
Textiles 42 2 5
Architecture 25 1 8
Commercial Art 23 3 4
Film and TV 27 7
Fine Arts 3 2
Individual Authors 2
Industrial Design 13 1 13
Music 30 63 4
Other-Misc. 15 2 3
Other-Professional,
Scientific, and Technical
Services 11 2 5
Other-
Retail/Wholesale/Durable
Goods 7 4
Performing Arts 2 1
Public Sector 1
Publishing 24 5 5
Software-Other 35 3 7
cSnftwnre-Vid1P enm 3
Finally, when separating the various copyright infringement claims into
§ 106 subsection subject-matter areas and linking those claims to the remedy
pursued in each case, the following findings emerge. First, the three most
frequent claims in copyright litigation-unauthorized reproduction,
unauthorized distribution, and unauthorized derivative works, which,
combined, amount to about 70 to 76 percent of plaintiffs-most commonly
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plead willful statutory damages." Second, allegations based on public
performance infringements show a reverse ratio of willful-to-regular statutory
damages pleadings. While 64 percent of plaintiffs in these cases request regular
statutory damages, only 26 percent of plaintiffs claim willful statutory awards.
Third, outside of § 106, secondary liability claims are more evenly distributed
across willful (48 percent) and regular (40 percent) statutory damages.7 9 Despite
these variations across statutory categories, a general finding is that statutory
damages claims-both willful and regular-are the de facto default remedy
asserted by plaintiffs, accounting for 82 percent of all pleadings in the database.
C. Case Outcomes
Next, I analyze the remainder of the docket entries to obtain information
regarding the course and outcome of copyright litigation.
A number of general observations are noteworthy. Defendants in
copyright litigation are relatively passive. Defendants responded in slightly over
half of the dataset's non-P2P cases (57.70 percent, or 221 cases). Only 23.24
percent of those 221 cases contained responses that included counterclaims or
cross-claims. Dispositive motions that, if successful, would terminate one or
more copyright claims (excluding motions for default judgment) were filed in
only 33 cases of the 162 cases with no answer filed. The remaining 33.68 percent
(129 cases) of commonplace cases lack a defensive action by the defendant,
suggesting possible consent to judgment or settlement. As non-P2P disputes
moved toward termination, at least one party filed a dispositive motion 45.93
percent of the time. Most of the disputes in the sample set (80.16 percent) were
terminated voluntarily following a settlement, agreed judgment, or voluntary
dismissal. Very few cases were terminated by trial (2.87 percent) or by
dispositive motion (10.97 percent). In non-P2P cases that reached judgment
(16.18 percent), defendants were victorious just over half the time (54.10
percent). Conversely, plaintiffs bested defendants less than half of the time
(45.90 percent) in those same disputes.
Turning to analyze the role of remedies in copyright litigation, it is notable
that when non-P2P cases were terminated, only a minority of cases resulted in a
78. Respectively, the percentages of those three claims that plead willful statutory damages are:
unauthorized reproductions, 87.99 percent; unauthorized distribution, 73.89 percent; and
unauthorized derivative works, 36.81 percent.
79. Claims outside of § 106 were quite uncommon: Both claims under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (4.70 percent) and the Visual Artists Rights Act (1.31 percent) were
infrequent. Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright's Topography, supra note 26, at 1998.
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damage award or injunctive remedy as granted by the court. Of course, this is in
line with expectations since most cases were terminated through action of the
parties. Injunctions were granted in 22.02 percent (83) of the cases, the majority
(63.85 percent) resulting from an agreed judgment between the parties. Just 1.78
percent of all non-P2P cases were terminated with a grant of enhanced statutory
damages. Regular statutory damages were obtained by plaintiffs in non-P2P
cases in less than 10 percent of all 338 cases.
Table 6: Damage Awarded-Non-P2P Percent
d amageawards.WithregrtP as s9.17%
tytis moamages.1.78%
Agi ccl Daages10.36%
Total338
When comparing cases that terminated with a damage award, a similar
pattern emerged: Regular damages are at least five times as likely than enhanced
damage awards. With regard to P2P cases specifically, regular statutory damage
are fifty times more likely to be obtained than enhanced statutory damages.
When differentiating across plaintiffs, F1000 companies are at the receiving end
of regular statutory damage awards in a majority (54 percent) of terminated
cases with remedies obtained.
Table 7: Damage Awarded-All Cases
Damage Award F11000 Individual Smuall Firm Total
2 1 3 6
Statutory-Willful (5.4%) (20%) (8.3%) (7.6%)
20 3 31
Statutory-Regular (54%) (60%) 8 (22.2%) (39.7%)
1 6
Actual Damages - (20%) 5 (13.8%) (7.6%)
15 35
Agreed Damages (40.5%) - 20 (55.5%) (44.8%)
203 2023
P2 s it =toa (4. ,Io - (7 2 2,")
2 2
Statutory-Willful (0.8%) - - (0.7%)
121 121
Statutory-Regular (50.4%) - - (43%)
80 80
Agreed Damages (33.3%) - - (28.4%)
Total 240 5 36 281
D. Settlement Patterns
Most of the disputes in the dataset (80.16 percent) were terminated
voluntarily via a direct action from the parties, either by settlement, agreed
judgment, or voluntary dismissal. As is commonplace in litigation more
generally," very few disputes concluded after trial (2.87 percent) or upon
80. See, e.g.,_Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009) (" [S]ettlement is the modal
civil case outcome.") (reporting settlement rates across areas of law in two districts).
426 66 UCLA L. REv. 400 (2019)
When the Remedy Is the Wrong 427
dispositive motion (10.97 percent). The full breakdown of the termination of
disputes is illustrated in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Termination Type-Commonplace cases (n=383)
Voluntary Dismissal 34.46%
Settlement 29.50%
Agreel judgm ent 16.19%
Default Judgment 5.48%
Other Dismissal 4.44%
Trial 2.87%
12(b)(6) Dismissal 2.35%
Siummary ludgient 2.09%
Still Open 1.57%
12(c) Dismissal 0.52%
Lack of Jurisdiction 0.52%
INOV1 0.00%
Given the number of disputes that were terminated by the parties, it is
important to recognize that court-ordered awards provide only partial and
potentially selective information about the outcome of all copyright disputes
initiated in this study's dataset." For instance, court-ordered willful statutory
awards will be less frequent and lower on average if clear, egregious offenses are
more likely to settle out of court.8 2 Therefore, it is also worthwhile to explore the
dataset for settlement patterns.
81. One such presumed selection effect is that hard cases go to trial and easy cases get settled.
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting the thesis that litigated cases have a 50 percent success rate); see
also Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427, 430-31 (1995) (providing empirical evidence of the selection effect in the
context of employment discrimination cases). See generally Joel Waldfogel, The Selection
Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. EcON. 229
(1995) (providing evidence for the Priest-Klein selection hypothesis).
82. This would be in line with the Priest-Klein "50-percent rule." See Priest & Klein, supra note
81.
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When comparing the outcomes of disputes in non-P2P disputes across
claims for actual damages, regular, and willful statutory damages, a few findings
emerge. Lawsuits that involve a claim for willful statutory damages settle more
often (29 percent) than suits in which the plaintiff requests regular statutory
damages (22 percent)." Additionally, while willful statutory damage claims
were dismissed voluntarily at about the same rate as claims with requests for
regular statutory damages and actual damages,84 nonvoluntary dismissals were
less frequent when involving willful statutory damage claims.
E. Analysis
The docket study reveals that avast majority of plaintiffs accuse defendants
of willful copyright infringement. Although accusations of willful infringement
have always been understood to be common in the context of P2P infringements,
accusations of willful infringement are surprisingly prominent across all types of
copyright subject-matter areas and litigants. The sheer number of willful
infringement claims is remarkable, especially in light of the congressional
intention to reserve enhanced statutory damages for exceptional instances.86
Interestingly, despite the overwhelming number of assertions to the
contrary by plaintiffs, courts rarely find that willful infringement took place."
What does this tell us? The most benign, albeit unrealistic, interpretation of this
gap between the demand and supply of willful statutory awards is that most of
those claims are valid and are subsequently resolved in a settlement between the
parties. That is, courts rarely honor requests for enhanced damages because such
claims are disproportionally settled at earlier stages of litigation. Without
inspecting the terms of all out of court settlements, a benign interpretation of
willful damage claims cannot be decisively excluded. Several of the findings
83. Specifically, 78 out of 276 infringement claims with willful statutory damage claims settled,
as compared to 19 out of 84 infringement claims involving regular statutory damage claims.
84. Voluntary dismissals occurred in 34 percent ofwillful statutory damages claims, 30 percent
of claims for regular statutory damages, and 35 percent of claims for actual damages.
85. Nonvoluntary dismissals occurred in just 1.5 percent of willful statutory damages claims, as
compared to 6 percent of claims for regular statutory damages, and 5.6 percent of claims for
actual damages.
86. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 441 & n.4 (citing S. REP. No. 94-473, at 144-45
(1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 162 (1975)); see also, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Wubbena,
No. 1:06-cv-2209-WSD, 2007 WL 656688, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2007) ("The Court
believes that statutory damage maximums should be reserved for cases of notable scope or
particularly egregious conduct.").
87. See supra Table 6 &
Table 7.
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suggest, however, that many claims for enhanced statutory damages are likely
without merit. First, focusing solely on cases where the plaintiff obtains a
favorable verdict, enhanced statutory damages are seldom awarded. Of all cases
where a plaintiff won on the merits of the case, only 2.8 percent of cases resulted
in an award of willful statutory damages. The rarity of enhanced awards makes
the nearly ubiquitous accusations of willful infringement and enhanced damages by
plaintiffs highly suspect. Second, the prevalence of enhanced damage pleadings
by low IP industry claimants" further casts doubt on the benign interpretation
that most of the accusations ofwillful infringement have merit. When copyright
protection is relatively modest-as is the case for more functional works such as
fashion items 89-it is less likely that so much infringing behavior is so egregious
that it qualifies as willful. Since the scope of protection is narrower for these
works, there is less potential for infringement to begin with. Moreover, since
infringements of works with only thin copyright protection are less obvious ex
ante, 90 a finding of willfulness by courts is relatively unlikely.
IV. CASE LAW ANALYSIS
While Part III applied a docket analysis method to examine the demand
and supply of willful statutory claims, this Part looks behind those numbers to
analyze litigated disputes involving discussions of willful infringement, the
arguments raised by the plaintiffs, and the definition and application of
enhanced damages for willful infringement by courts.
88. Almost 30 percent of all litigated works in the non-P2P cases involve low IP protection areas
(Apparel/Fashion/Textiles, Architectural Works, and Industrial Design). Cotropia & Gib-
son, Copyright's Topography, supra note 26, at 1996. Parties in low IP industries plead willful
infringement as often or more than parties in subject-matter areas where copyright protec-
tion is considered to be stronger. For example, plaintiffs in apparel, fashion and textile in-
dustries claimed willful damages in 80 percent of disputes (42 out of 52). Plaintiffs in non-
P2P disputes involving film and TV claimed willful damages in 75 percent of disputes (27
out of 36) and plaintiffs in non-P2P disputes involving music claimed willful damages in 39
percent of disputes (30 out of 101). See supra
Table 5.
89. See Cotropia & Gibson, Copyright's Topography, supra note 26, at 2016-17 ("Apparel is
famously difficult to protect under copyright law, and industrial design and architectural
works are likewise hampered by functionality constraints and other exceptions to
copyright's usual reach." (footnotes omitted)).
90. See id. at 2018 ("Legal outcomes are less certain for industries and works at the periphery of
copyright law").
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A. Coding
I identified all decisive court decisions where courts addressed a claim of
willful copyright infringement.91 The resulting dataset consists of 102 decisions
from 2005 to 2008.
While the original docket database contained a large set of coded variables
relating to procedural aspects of litigation,92 this second coding project focused
more narrowly on the substantive remedies pursued and awarded in each case.
Drawing upon the existing literature, leading treatises, and academic
scholarship, and an initial examination of a random sample of 20 cases, the
following variables and data points were coded for all 102 cases. 93 First, I
identified the copyright subject-matter areas, as well as a description of the
defendant's allegedly infringing actions. Second, the plaintiffs proposed
definition of willfulness (if any) was coded, as was the definition of willfulness
employed by the court and any additional considerations of culpability
highlighted by the court. Third, the remedial outcome and amount granted were
noted. Fourth, the express calculation of the statutory award was described.
Fifth, it was coded whether the court awarded enhanced damages, and I noted
the number of infringing works, the amount sought per infringing work, the
total amount requested, the amount awarded by the court for each infringing
work, and the total award granted by the court. Sixth, when available, I noted the
policy objectives that the court explicitly associated with an award of willful
statutory damages. Seventh, cases were analyzed to detect whether willful
damage claims were tied to particular litigation strategies. Finally, a series of
additional variables were coded that would help identify differences and
common patterns in the topography of disputes where plaintiffs claimed willful
infringement. These coded variables helped identify for each dispute: the
presence of (1) awards of attorney fees, (2) a fair use defense, (3) accusation of
multiple works being infringed, (4) default judgments, and (5) secondary
liability claims.
91. Towards this purpose, I populated a list of cases by conducting a Westlaw search for all
copyright cases between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008 that featured the terms
"willful" and "infringement" in the opinion.
92. See sources cited supra note 26 and accompanying text.
93. The coding process consisted of three stages. In the first stage, two research assistants were
trained and supervised to code halfofthe database each. In the second stage, a third research
assistant verified and corrected (where needed) all coding. In the third stage, I personally
verified the coding of all variables in the spreadsheet.
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B. Results
As Table 9 below indicates, willful infringement accusations mostly surface in
three subject-matter areas: movie pictures and television (26.5 percent), music (21.5
percent), 94 and software (21.5 percent, excluding video games). The musical work
infringements cases included three disputes involving file-sharing and twelve disputes
concerning public performances (11.7 percent of all cases). In almost all disputes (92
percent), the defendant is accused of infringing the copyright on multiple works. In
the vast majority of cases (77.3 percent), the plaintiff was awarded attorney fees.
Over half of the litigation (59 percent) resulted in a default judgement.
94. Just three out of twenty-two musical work cases in the dataset involved file-sharing.
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Table 9: Subject-Matter Areas
Advertising and Marketing 3
Apparel/Fashion/Textiles 5
Architecture 1
Commercial Art 8
Movie Pictures 18
TV 9
Fine Arts 0
Individual Authors 2
Industrial Design 0
Musical Works 22
Other-Misc. 0
Other-Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 4
Other-Retail/Wholesale/Durable Goods 0
Performing Arts 0
Public Sector 0
Publishing 8
Software-Other 22
Software-Video Games 0
Total 102
In about 35 percent of all disputes in the dataset, arguments by the plaintiff
that substantiate the alleged "willfulness" of the accused infringer's actions are
wholly absent in the verdict.9 5 When the case for willfulness was expressed by the
95. In a wide range of disputes in the dataset, plaintiffs demand enhanced damages without
specifying what factually qualifies the behavior of the defendant as willful. The opinions do
not include any specification as to why infringing behavior by the defendant qualifies as
willful. For an illustration, see Sony Pictures Home Entm't v. Lott, 471 F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (defendant illegally downloaded digital copies of motion pictures and distributed
them on peer-to-peer networks); Elektra Entm't Grp. v. Barnett, No. 5:07-CV-00121-F,
2007 WL 3542456 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2007) (defendant used online media distribution
system to download and distribute plaintiffs copyrighted recordings); Twentieth Century
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plaintiff, its most frequent basis was continued infringing activity by the
defendant after receiving an infringement notice.96
Second, courts do not have a uniform focal point for determining willful
infringement. As Table 10 below illustrates, courts primarily focus on actual or
constructive knowledge when determining whether the infringement was
committed willfully (about 43 percent of cases).9 7 Courts focus only on actual
knowledge in about 10 percent of cases, as some courts (at the behest of the
plaintiff) find it sufficient that the defendant was put on notice by the plaintiff at
any time prior to litigation. Additionally, courts sometimes inquire into the
"blameworthiness" of the defendant.9 8 In about 23 percent of cases, however,
courts rule on willfulness without referencing any particular definition of
willfulness.99
Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Ariz. 2006) (defendant used content
from plaintiffs films without permission); IQ Grp. v. Wiesner Publ'g, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587
(D.N.J. 2006) (plaintiff claims defendants used plaintiffs copyrighted artwork without
permission). Similarly, the pleadings in these disputes rarely specify the willful aspects of
the infringing conduct.
96. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Moss, No. 1:06-CV-1670-JOF, 2007 WL 2782503 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
20, 2007) (defendants continued to distribute illegal software despite cease and desist letter
from Microsoft); Wavemaker Music, Inc. v. Kartouche, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-233-HES-HTS,
2007 WL 2254505 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2007) (defendants ignored plaintiffs requests, and
"continued to flout their obligation to attain a license for public performances of the
copyrighted works"); WB Music Corp. v. Symetry Enters., No. 3:06cv01214 (MRK) (WIG),
2007 WL 2126361 (D. Conn. June 26, 2007) (defendants refused ASCAP offers to sell them
a license and continued with unlicensed activities).
97. See, e.g., Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("For
the purpose of awarding enhanced statutory damages under § 504(c)(2), an infringement is
'willful' if the defendant had 'knowledge that its actions constitute an infringement.' This
knowledge may be 'actual or constructive."' (quoting Fitzgerald Pub. Co. v. Baylor Pub. Co,
807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)); Disney Enters. v. Merchant, No. 6:05-CV-1489, 2007
WL 1101110, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2007) ("An infringer acts willfully, within the
meaning of the Act, when he or she knows or has constructive knowledge that infringement
is occurring." (citations omitted)); Eros Entm't, Inc. v. Melody Spot, L.L.C., No. 99 CV 1157
(SJ), 2005 WL 4655385, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005) ("[I]t is sufficient to find that the
defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge that his actions constituted an
infringement." (citations omitted)).
98. See, e.g., Webloyalty.com, Inc. v. Consumer Innovations, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 435,442 (D.
Del. 2005) ("The factors used to determine the level of statutory damages include: 'the
expenses saved and the profits earned by the defendant, the revenues lost by the plaintiff,
and the defendant's state of mind.' 'Normally, it is the blameworthiness of the defendant
which weighs the heaviest in the court's analysis."' (quoting Compendia Songs v. On Top
Commc'ns, LLC, No. CIV.A.04-252-GMS, 2004 WL 2898070, at *4 (D. Del. Nov. 15,
2004))).
99. See, e.g, Arista Records LLC v. Furia Sonidera, Inc., No. 05 CV 5906 (ILG) (RER), 2007 WL
922406 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007) (awarding $500,000 in damages for willful infringement
on the basis of file-sharing activities); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Porto Bello of Sw. Fla., Inc.,
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Some courts find willfulness with mere reference to the factual
circumstances surrounding the infringement, including continued
infringement after receiving notice, distribution on P2P file sharing, and failure
to cooperate with discovery. Finally, about 10 percent of willful infringement
decisions consist of default judgements.
Table 10: Most Common Judicial Approaches to Willfulness-Courts
Akpproach Count Percent
Actual or constructive knowledge 43 42.57%
None 23 22.77%
Actual knowledge 10 9.90%
Willful blindness 8 7.92%
In the 43 cases (42 percent) where a court defined willfulness as having
actual of constructive knowledge, 13 cases (30 percent) involved instances where
the court deemed the behavior of the defendant also to involve a reckless
disregard of the rights of the copyright owner."oo Ignoring and continuing after
being notified by the plaintiff are maj or considerations here as well (17 cases, or
39.53 percent, of cases). Overall, continuing infringing behavior after receiving
notice, is a factor of consideration in 25 percent of all cases involving willful
infringement. In just 4 of those cases (3.9 percent) no finding of willfulness is
made. Factors such as a history of repeat infringements or the business
experience of the defendant figured less prominently in the opinions (less than 9
percent).
No. 2:05-CV-69-FTM-99SPC, 2006 WL 1824497 (M.D. Fla. June 30,2006) (finding willful
infringement for public performance of musical works without permission).
100. See In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[A] finding of 'willfulness' in this
context can be based on either 'intentional' behavior, or merely 'reckless' behavior."
(citations omitted)); Disney Enters. v. Delane, 446 F. Supp. 2d 402,406 (D. Md. 2006) ("The
standard for willfulness is whether the defendant had knowledge that his or her conduct
represented infringement or the defendant recklessly disregarded that possibility." (citation
omitted)).
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Table 11: Actual or Constructive Knowledge: Factors of Consideration
Reckless disregard of plaintiff s rights 13 30.23%
Ignoring notices 9 20.93%
Continued after notice 8 18.60%
Default judgments 4 9.30%
Experienced businessman that should have 3 6.98%
known
Actual knowledge 2 4.65%
D's failure to establish good faith and 1 2.33%
reasonable belief
Desire and purpose to trade on good will 1 2.33%
Repeats infringement 1 2.33%
Deliberate act 1 2.33%
Total 43 100.00%
When courts discuss the purpose of statutory damages, they adhere to both
the compensatory and deterrent goals of this form of relief. When setting regular
statutory awards within the statutory range, courts generally estimate (on the
basis of a rough proxy) the actual damages caused by the infringement and likely
profits of the defendant.0 ' Deterrence motives feature prominently in judicial
calculations of the statutory damage amounts (60.39 percent of cases where
courts identified a policy objective). While some courts also focus on the goal of
discouraging a specific infringer (20 percent of cases where courts identify
individual deterrence as a policy objective), most verdicts refer to the goal of
deterring copyright infringement in general. 10 2 Interestingly, when courts justify
multiplying the award for the purpose of deterring future infringements, they do
not set the multiplier to make up for the less than perfect probability of detection,
101. In this regard, the findings resonate with prior research that establishes that courts proceed
in this manner when there is some evidence available about harm and profits. See 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 14.2.1, at 14:46 (3d ed. Supp. 2015) ("Courts will often try to
approximate actual damages and profits when making a statutory damage award." (footnote
omitted)).
102. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Zahn, No. 3:06-0212, 2007 WL 542816, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Feb. 16, 2007) (finding that the statutory scheme is "designed not solely to compensate the
copyright owner for losses incurred, but also to deter future infringement" (quoting
Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 504 (6th Cir.1998))).
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as suggested by the economic analysis of punitive damages."o3 Instead, courts
regularly resort to a mechanical formula of multiplication, 04 or simply ensure
that the damage exceeds the compensatory level. In eight cases (7.8 percent) the
court found willfulness and granted the maximum statutory award of $150,000
per infringed work.1 5 In 10 percent of all cases involving a finding of willfulness
(76 cases), the court set the award at the $150,000 maximum.
Many plaintiffs accuse the defendant of willful infringement but
nevertheless indicate that they would be satisfied with the court setting an award
within the regular, non-willful statutory damages range. 10 6
103. On the economics of punitive damages, see, for example, Robert D. Cooter, Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79 (1982); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998).
104. See, e.g, Girlsongsv. 609 Indus., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1127,1131 (D. Colo. 2008) ("Recognizing
the important deterrent purpose served by statutory damages, the courts routinely award as
statutory damages in cases such as this amounts that are between two and three times license
fees." (citations omitted)).
105. In re Frye, No. CC-08-1055-PaMkK, 2008 WL 8444822 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2008)
(debtor copied content guides and submitted them as his own); Axact (PVT), Ltd. v. Student
Network Res., Inc., No. 07-5491 (FLW), 2008 WL 4754907 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2008) (infringing
online database competed with plaintiff and engaged in repeat infringements and deliberate
evasion); Mitchell Int'l v. Fraticelli, No. 03-1031 (GAG/BJM), 2007 WL 4197583 (D.P.R
Nov. 26, 2007) (defendant used and sold counterfeit software); Entral Grp. Int'l v. Sun Sports
Bar Inc., No. 05-CV-4836 (CBA), 2007 WL 2891419 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,2007) (karaoke bar
copied and used copyrighted songs without permission); Entral Grp. Int'l v. Honey Caf6 on
5th, Inc., No. 05 CV 2290 NGG MDG, 2006 WL 3694584 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2006) (same);
Quilled Creations, LLC v. Scrapcuts, LLC, No. 04-CV-6385 CJS, 2005 WL 2136916
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005) (defendants copied plaintiffs artwork, passed it off as their own
creation, and did not cease their activities upon receiving notice from copyright owner);
Design Tex. Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Vinyl Mfg., No. 04 Civ. 5002(JSR), 2005 WL 2063819 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2005) (repeat infringements of wallpaper design after notice); U2 Home Entm't v.
Lai Ying Music & Video Trading, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1233 (DLC), 2005 WL 1231645 (S.D.N.Y.
May 25, 2005), affd in relevant part sub nom., U2 Home Entm't v. Wei Ping Yuan, 245 Fed.
App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2007) (repeated infringing commercial importation of Chinese movies by
N.Y. video rental store).
106. See, e.g, Microsoft Corp. v. Nop, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ("Although
plaintiffs complaint alleges willful infringement of copyrights and trademarks, plaintiff
seeks only the maximum amount of statutory damages permitted for non-willful copyright
infringement...."); Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
("Microsoft requests only the maximum amount of statutory damages available for non-
willful trademark infringement and copyright infringement."); Broad. Music, Inc. v. H.S.I.,
Inc., No. C2-06-482, 2007 WL 4207901, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) ("Plaintiffs urge the
Court to award $3,000 for each copyrighted song that Defendants admit to publicly playing
on September 8, 2005. Plaintiffs contend that damages of $3,000 per song is an adequate
deterrent to future infringement, [and] is justified in light of Defendants' willful
infringement... ."); Disney Enters. v. Delane, 446 F. Supp. 2d 402, 407 (D. Md. 2006) ("For
the remaining ten programs, Plaintiffs have requested a reasonable amount of statutory
damages. The evidence shows that Delane's actions were willful infringements of Plaintiffs'
copyrighted programs."). Interestingly, in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. H.S.I., Inc., the plaintiffs'
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C. Analysis
First, as Part III documented, plaintiffs in various low IP industries
(including apparel/fashion/textiles, architecture, and industrial design) figure
prominently in the docket records."' By contrast, movie pictures, cable
television shows, musical works, and software account for 70.5 percent of all
disputed works in the advanced stages of litigation involving damages for willful
infringement. Additionally, disputes in movie pictures, cable television shows,
musical works, and software disproportionally result in default judgements.
Almost 85 percent of the total number of default judgments are situated in these
subject-matter areas.
These differences between the docket record and the case law could be the
result of differences among the strength of the infringement claims or the
attitude of defendants across these industries. As the docket analysis in Part III
revealed, willful infringement claims by low IP claimants get settled and
dismissed more regularly than claims in the other main subject-matter areas.
The fact that these cases are terminated prior to litigation could suggest that
those claims were weaker to begin with."'
Second, it is noteworthy that about 40 percent of all claims of willful
infringement include only sparse information as to what actions amount to
willfulness, according to plaintiffs. Many plaintiffs allege willfulness without any
further specification whatsoever.1 09 Other pleadings equate receiving a notice of
complaint as satisfying the knowledge condition of willfulness. Properly
conceived, actual or constructive knowledge requires more than simply
receiving notice by the copyright holder, however: Actual notice entails that the
infringing nature of the defendant's action are so obvious that, initially or
certainly upon receipt of a notice from the copyright owner, the alleged infringer
should have ceased the activity.' A defendant who has been notified by a
strategy was to get a lower amount for each work but multiply that amount many times over
by counting many technical infringements involving different works. 2007 WL 4207901, at*5.
107. See supra
Table 5.
108. The competing hypothesis is that they are stronger, causing defendants to settle and avoid
the unpleasant prospect of litigation. Several of the factors highlighted in Subpart III.E cast
doubt on this interpretation, however.
109. See supra note 100.
110. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996)
("'[W]illfully' means with knowledge that the defendant's conduct constitutes copyright
infringement. Otherwise, there would be no point in providing specially for the reduction
of minimum awards in the case of innocent infringement, because any infringement that
was nonwillful would necessarily be innocent." (citation omitted)).
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copyright owner that the copyright owner believes that the defendant's conduct
constitutes copyright infringement might still reasonably and in good faith
believe the contrary, and not be willful."'
Third, a considerable amount of adjudication occurs in a void of meaning
as to what actions might qualify as willful. Over 20 percent of cases are
adjudicated without any indication ofwhat guided the court to its determination
regarding willfulness.
Fourth, the data reveals a peculiar litigation strategy on behalf of some
plaintiffs. A portion of plaintiffs assert willful infringement but state that they
are satisfied with a regular statutory damage award. Why would a victim of
willful infringement voluntarily deprive itself of the higher range for statutory
damages? Two potential explanations come to mind. First, by turning down the
higher range of willful infringement, the plaintiff might be hoping that he or she
will be perceived by court and jury as a reasonable actor, potentially inducing a
more favorable look at the various other facts at issue. Second, in this process of
garnering sympathy, the plaintiff might hope that the court or jury will set the
award at a higher amount than would otherwise be the case if the plaintiff had
insisted on willfulness and was turned down by the court or jury.
D. Summary
The analysis of the case law in this Part reveals considerable ambiguity as it
relates to potential findings of willfulness and the enhanced awards that may
follow as a result of such a finding. The flexible standard of "knowledge" that
courts employ, and the role of notice letters, open the door to the potential award
of enhanced damages in many disputes and may be a contributing factor to the
practices highlighted by the docket study in Part III. The next Part discusses the
implications of the findings and formulates several policy proposals.
V. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS
The 1976 Copyright Act has been slated for reform. The Register of
Copyrights has called for a wholesale adaptation of the federal copyright statute
111. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04 [B] [3] (1996)
(" [O]ne who has been notified that his conduct constitutes copyright infringement, but who
reasonably and in good faith believes the contrary, is not 'willful' for these purposes." (cited
in Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1392)).
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for the digital age.H2 A team of academics, practitioners, and industry experts
has produced The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, the
culmination of three years of inquiry into "how current copyright law could be
improved and how the law's current problems could be mitigated.""' The
House Judiciary Committee announced a "wide review" of copyright law and
"related enforcement mechanisms."1 4 For the past few years, it has been
conducting a comprehensive series of hearings on U.S. copyright law across the
country. Statutory damages figure prominently in these discussions."' The
study presented in this Article provides empirical grounding for the ongoing
discussions of the optimal reform of copyright remedies.
Although the 1976 Copyright Act provides neither a definition nor
examples of willfulness,H6 the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended that enhanced damages apply to "exceptional" circumstances,'17 such
as large-scale counterfeiters and repeat infringers."' In light of this observation,
the data presented in Parts III and IV reveals a pervasive practice of overclaiming
among plaintiffs. My findings reveal a stark discrepancy between the demand
for statutory damages by plaintiffs on the one hand, and the supply by courts on
the other hand. Although 80 percent of plaintiffs in all disputes claim they
suffered conduct that constitutes willful infringement, courts only consider
enhanced damages to be justified in just 2 percent of cases where a plaintiff wins
the case. This gap between the demand and supply of statutory damages
undermines the legal credibility of the plaintiffs' claims in copyright disputes.
Several surrounding factors cast doubt on the pervasive practice of alleging
willful infringement.1 9  Also, claims of willfulness regularly surface in
circumstances that make egregious infringement improbable. 120  This is
especially true for disputes in low IP subject-matter areas, and situations where
112. See generally Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 315
(2013) (setting out in detail the problems with the current copyright statute and the Register
of Copyright's vision for overhauling the statute and Copyright Office).
113. Samuelson et al., supra note 25, at 1176.
114. Press Release, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Chairman Goodlatte Announces
Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), http://judiciary.house.gov/press-
release/chairmangoodlatteannouncescomprehensivereviewofcopyrightlaw
[https://perma.cc/QPZ4-NNDW].
115. See id. ("There are concerns about statutory license and damage mechanisms.").
116. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018).
117. See supra note 44.
118. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 458.
119. Supra Subpart III.E.
120. Supra Subpart III.E.
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plausible fair use offenses are asserted, when harm is veryminimal, or when there
are no profits obtained from the infringement.
"Remedy overclaiming" likely serves strategic purposes. First, as revealed
in the case law analysis conducted in Part IV,121 pleas of willful infringement are
deployed by plaintiffs as a "bait-and-switch" tactic: by accusing the defendant of
willful infringement, a plaintiff may appear more reasonable to the court and
jury when subsequently requesting regular statutory damages and may hope to
obtain a higher award within the regular statutory range.122 Second, by
increasing the perceived risk to a defendant, claiming willful statutory awards
might induce more generous settlement concessions than would otherwise be
justified on the merits of the case and the likely outcome at trial. For instance,
statutory awards are rare but not impossible when a defendant has a plausible
fair use defense.12 3 As a result, risk-averse defendants might simply prefer to
avoid taking the chance of incurring enhanced statutory damages altogether.
Remedy overclaiming is problematic in several ways. Bad faith claims
unduly waste the time and resources of courts and defendants. Additionally, the
potential for statutory damage awards may induce a risk-averse defendant to
settle claims that they otherwise would resist. This is especially true when one
considers the upper limits of the statutory range, the legal uncertainty involved,
and the media attention to outliers. In this regard, § 504 may have the
inadvertent effect of expanding the scope of copyright,1 2 4 and even worse, it may
produce a chilling effect on creative processes and innovation. 12 5
The current abuse of the statutory damage framework can be addressed
either by making remedy overclaiming more risky and costly to opportunistic
plaintiffs or by reducing the risk of overclaiming to defendants. The remainder
of this Part discusses both approaches.
121. Supra Subpart IV.C.
122. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Online Datalink Comput., Inc., No. 07cv01165 WQH (CAB),
2008 WL 1995209, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2008) ("Microsoft's requested statutory damages
are reasonable given Microsoft has only requested the maximum non-willful statutory
damages despite the alleged willful conduct." (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 10.
123. Cf L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 WL 565200, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 4, 2000); Stipulation for Entry of Amended Final Judgment, L.A. Times v. Free
Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2002) (cited in Samuelson &
Wheatland, supra note 24, at 462-63).
124. See Depoorter & Walker, supra note 20 (examining enabling effect of automated
enforcement practices on aggressive enforcement practices); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899 (2007) (describing
influence of customs in copyright licensing and how courts point to nonconformity with
industry practices as a basis for infringement).
125. See Carrier, supra note 63, at 950-58.
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A. Increasing the Costs of Overclaiming
Overstating legal claims about harm is risky in most areas of litigation.
Inflated statements about injury or harm suffered may be contested in dismissal,
summary motions, and discovery proceedings.1 2 6 Exaggerated, inflated damage
claims may constitute a form of insurance fraudl2 7 or be sanctioned as frivolous
litigation.128
Not so in copyright law. The statutory damage framework removes all
accountability that plaintiffs would otherwise face when overstating damage
claims in other areas of litigation. To explain, Section 504(c) of the Copyright
Act entirely relieves plaintiffs of the obligation to justify damage claims in
reference to any actual injury or harm. At any time during copyright litigation,
a plaintiff is free to request that the court set an award along the statutorily
provided range. If the plaintiff can convince the court that the copyright
infringement was willful, the award can reach $150,000 for each infringed
copyrighted work.1 2 9 This disproportionate gulf between the damage claim and
the actual harm makes statutory damages troubling.
Although Section 505 of the Copyright Act penalizes copyright plaintiffs
when filing unwarranted and frivolous claims,130 it is wholly ineffective in
addressing the problem of remedy overclaiming. Attorney cost fee-shifting
under Section 505 is available only to the prevailing party in litigation."' As a
result, fee-shifting is not available to defendants when plaintiffs grossly overstate
the available remedy in disputes that are otherwise meritorious. If a plaintiff
prevails in litigation, unreasonable statements about the remedy are sheltered
from Section 505. Moreover, even if a plaintiff loses the case, fee-shifting is
126. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 808 F.3d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2015)
(affirming grant of summary judgment for failure to prove damages).
127. See generally Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 907, 928-30 (1992) (discussing legal pursuit of inflated damages claims as
insurance fraud).
128. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (district court may sanction attorneys or parties who submit
pleadings for an improper purpose or that contain frivolous arguments or arguments that
have no evidentiary support).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2018).
130. Section 505 states that a district court "may... award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party." 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018). For instance, when a plaintiff is found to have
pursued a claim in bad faith, when a claim is held objectively unreasonable, or when the
losing party delayed a hearing on the merits in order to run up the opposing party's costs,
courts can order a plaintiff to pay the expense or attorney's fees of the opposing party, or
both. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, at § 14.10 [D].
131. Id.
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unlikely unless the substance of the infringement claim itself was based on an
unreasonable legal position.132
Willful statutory damages are a nearly universal feature of infringement
notice letters and infringement claims.3 A partial explanation for this common
occurrence includes the lack of incentives to induce plaintiff honesty.
In order to use fee-shifting to discourage remedy overclaiming, Congress
needs to amend Section 505. An overhaul of Section 505 would enable courts to
sanction a prevailing party that made unreasonable damage claims, including
the appeal to willfulness in circumstances where such a finding is extremely
unlikely. One possible avenue would be to revise Section 505 so that courts are
able to take away the benefit of fee-shifting for a prevailing party that overstates
the case with regard to the applicable remedy.13 4
In the recent Kirtsaeng decision,"1 5 the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
again that district courts should take into account "all other circumstances
relevant to granting fees."1 3 6 In light of the findings of the study presented here,
it might make sense that a district court's "range of considerations beyond the
reasonableness of litigating positions" includes the reasonableness of the
plaintiff s remedy claim.3
B. Reducing the Benefits of Overclaiming
A second approach to remedy overclaiming in copyright law involves
targeting statutory damage claims as a means to induce unwarranted settlement
concessions. If opportunistic plaintiffs leverage the perceived risk of copyright
litigation into generous settlements, reducing the indeterminacy associated with
judicial applications of statutory damages can undermine this strategy.
The study of the case law in Part IV of this Article indicates that courts
reserve willful infringements for only a small subset of cases. Nevertheless, the
132. The Third Circuit has listed the following nonexclusive factors that courts should consider
in making awards of attorney's fees to any prevailing party: "frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and
the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (quoting Lieb v.
Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (1986)).
133. Supra Subpart II.B, Table 2.
134. Alternatively, a more stringent approach would be to amend Section 505 so that courts are
able to award attorneys' fees against a prevailing party if the latter engaged in egregious
remedy overclaiming.
135. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016).
136. Id. at 1982; see also Scott Graham, Copyright Fee-Shifting Clarified, NAT'L L.J., June 20,2016,
at 1.
137. Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1988.
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risk associated with statutory damages may still be daunting to defendants. The
mere possibility of a maximum statutory award of $150,000 is frightening,
especially when the infringement involves multiple works."'
The findings of this study support reform measures that reduce the
uncertainty and risk of disproportionate statutory awards: the adoption of
guidelines and standards, efforts to eliminate outlier awards, and limiting the
availability of statutory damages when evidence of actual harm is readily
available.
1. Guidelines & Standards
Reducing the existing ambiguity and inconsistency in the case law would
eliminate the main causes of remedy overclaiming. Greater doctrinal
predictability would greatly reduce the perceived risk of overstated damage
claims, while also making the direct fee-shifting reform options presented in
Subpart V.A more attractive. One way to improve legal transparency is to
formulate a set of standards that courts would use in determining when and how
to apply statutory damages. Along these lines, a group of copyright academics
recommend that Congress develop "guidelines to make statutory damages more
consistent and equitable."1 39
In light of the insights presented in this Article, the following guidelines
would have an inhibiting effect on overclaiming. A useful first step could be to
reduce the statutory range. For instance, the minimum statutory award could be
mandated in cases where the plaintiff suffers no lost profits, or when damages
and profits are nominal. A second course of action could be to require that
courts explain the motivation and calculation involved with every statutory
award on the record. Third, in order to improve transparency and enhance
consistency in judicial statutory award practices, it would be helpful to set up a
138. The latter issue presents itself acutely in the context of secondary copyright infringement for
online intermediaries. See Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 4-5, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480): "The mandatory mechanism of statutory damages for
copyright infringement has crushing implications for multi-purpose technologies, where
illicit use by third parties could quickly mount into millions or even billions of dollars." For
examples of the cumulative effect of maximum statutory damages for multiple awards, see
Purewal, supra note 16, and Bryan Sullivan, Getty Likely to Settle $1B Suit by Photographer
for Appropriating Her Public-Domain Work, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2016, 12:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2016/08/03/pay-up-getty- sends-trolling-
letter-to-photographer-highsmith-demanding-money-for-her-own-photos/#71aboacc2c2b.
139. Samuelson et al., supra note 25, at 1196; id. at 1221 ("If statutory damages are to be retained
in U.S. copyright law, guidelines for their just application should be developed."); see also
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 501-09.
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central database that documents statutory award verdicts. Just like today's tort
and settlement databases, a statutory award archive could be created to increase
transparency.140
2. Reducing Outliers
Overstated statutory damage claims can intimidate defendants especially
against the background of the spectacular, outlier awards that have received
media attention over the past decade. Recent examples include the six-figure
statutory damages awards for noncommercial file sharing by a single mother and
a graduate student, as applied in Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset41 and
Sony BMG v. Tenebaum.14 2
No matter how unlikely maximum willful awards might be, the very
possibility of these awards is imposing. As mentioned previously, since statutory
damages awards are applied "for all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work,"l43 willful statutory awards can really add up, especially
in the digital era where multiple works are infringed at once, as is common
practice in online piracy.
Congress might consider eliminating enhanced statutory damage awards
altogether in future revisions of the Copyright Act. This would be the most
straightforward approach to eliminating the anxiety-provoking effect of outlier
damage awards. Such a measure might appear drastic but would actually align
the United States with most civil and common law systems throughout the
world. In most countries, knowledge or reckless disregard by the infringer is a
threshold requirement to be entitled to any monetary recovery. In the absence
of monetary relief, copyright holders still have injunctive remedies at their
disposal.144
140. See Depoorter, supra note 63, at 967-68 (documenting information pooling concerning tort
verdicts and settlements).
141. 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010), vacated by 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). The court
eventually reduced the award on remand because "[t]he need for deterrence cannot justify
a $2 million verdict for stealing and illegally distributing 24 songs for the sole purpose of
obtaining free music. Moreover, although Plaintiffs were not required to prove their actual
damages, statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual damages." Id. at 1048-49.
142. 660 F.3d 487,490 (1st Cir. 2011).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2018); see supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
144. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE 417 (3d ed. 2013) ("Monetary relief in both civil law and common law
jurisdictions generally adheres to the same pattern and, with the notable exception of the
United States, to the requirement that the infringer's knowledge, or negligent disregard, of
the infringement be shown before damages can be recovered.").
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Alternatively, Congress could reduce the number of occasions where
outlier awards are possible. This could be accomplished, for instance, by
restricting awards to the minimum range in the case of noncommercial
infringements where the defendant obtains no financial profits and the harm to
the plaintiff is minimal. Additionally, taking a page from the punitive damages
jurisprudence,145 a maximum cap could be imposed on the ratio of actual harm
to enhanced awards.
3. Evidentiary Defaults
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, some courts held that statutory damages
were unavailable when the injury to the copyright holder and the profits of the
infringers had been proven.146 The 1976 Copyright Act made the statutory
remedy available at the copyright owner's election regardless of evidentiary
considerations. Plaintiffs now are no longer required by law to present any
evidence proving actual damages or defendants' profits in support oftheir prayer
for copyright statutory damages. Indeed, authorities agree that a plaintiff may
recover statutory damages "regardless of the adequacy of the evidence offered as
to his actual damages and the amount of defendant's profits, and even if he has
intentionally declined to offer such evidence, although it was available."1 4 7
For at least two reasons, this direction is questionable. First, by treating
statutory damages to the copyright owner as a full-fledged alternative to actual
damages-even when there is evidence of actual injury and profits-the
Copyright Act inadvertently enables the opportunistic use of statutory damages.
Specifically, the elective nature of statutory damages has a selection effect on the
type of copyright infringement plaintiffs: If conditions are conducive to
145. After years of uncertainty, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately set limits on the punitive-to-
compensatory damage ratio in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
For an overview, see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 464-73.
146. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d. 162, 168 (1st Cir. 1951);
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 378 (9th Cir. 1947).
147. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8 § 14.04 [A], at 14:66. " [T]he plaintiff in an infringement
suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on the
provision for minimum statutory damages." Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 161 (1976)). In fact, the legislative history indicates that this is consistent with the
intention of Congress with respect to cases in which there is no proof of actual damages and
profits. See id. But there is nothing that prevents courts from refusing to award more than
the statutory minimum without an offering of proof that an amount in excess of the
minimum is justified. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 24, at 502 (providing
recommendation that courts "[a]sk the parties to offer proof of damages and profits, or, in
the alternative, to demonstrate why damages or profits are sufficiently difficult to prove that
it is justifiable to offer no such proof').
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obtaining an award above and beyond his or her actual harm, a plaintiff will
almost invariably elect to pursue statutory damages. If our system of statutory
damages seeks to minimize the evidentiary burden on a copyright plaintiff, why
then does Section 504(c) come to the aid of copyright plaintiffs when evidence of
the damage is readily available? While it may make sense to relieve a copyright
holder from the burden of establishing injury or contesting the defendant's
evidence, it is doubtful that the election of statutory damages can be justified
when evidence of both damage and profiteering is available. In the process,
Section 504(c) has created fertile ground for copyright trolls and other
opportunistic enforcement business models. For these reasons, it would be
worthwhile to revise Section 504(c) so that statutory damages are not available
when the defendant has offered credible evidence of its profits and/or the
plaintiffs damages. Removing the elective statutory option in these
circumstances would effectively eliminate a subset of potentially opportunistic
applications of the statutory damage framework.
CONCLUSION
Once upon a time, copyright enforcement was a relatively quiet backwater
where copyright holders sparred with commercial pirates and bootleg recorders.148
No longer. The digital revolution has brought enforcement to everyone's doorstep.
Copyright enforcement now affects what we can watch online, what we create and
share with others, 1 4 9 and even determines what technologies we are allowed to use. 15
As the stakes have increased, so has the intensity of enforcement. Faced
with rampant online infringements, copyright holders aggressively protect their
rights. Programmed bots scrape the Internet for infringing material, automated
systems spew out cease-and-desist letters at dazzling rates,151 and, as documented
above, copyright holders routinely employ enhanced damage claims to threaten
and subdue alleged infringers into making settlement concessions.
148. See, e.g, CLINTON HEYLIN, BOOTLEG: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE OTHER RECORDING
INDUSTRY (St. Martin Griffin ed. 1996).
149. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2009) (describing copyright aspects of
user generated content online).
150. See Carrier, supra note 63, at 953-55 (describing chilling effect of copyright enforcement on
venture capital investments in content-related innovative technologies since Napster). For
a concise history of copyright holders' enforcement actions against new technologies, see
Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 125 (2011) (documenting negative overreactions to new technologies).
151. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 21 (questioning lack of transparency involving
algorithmic law enforcement technologies).
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The findings of the docket study and case analysis above suggest that the
statutory damage framework is a remedy in dire need of reform. Excesses by
opportunistic plaintiffs must be curbed, all the while preserving the valid
purpose of statutory damages in reducing litigation costs. The substantive and
procedural proposals formulated in this Article are an important step in this direction.
